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During observation of ambiguous ﬁgures our perception reverses spontaneously although
the visual information stays unchanged. Research on this phenomenon so far suffered
from the difﬁculty to determine the instant of the endogenous reversals with sufﬁcient
temporal precision. A novel experimental paradigm with discontinuous stimulus presenta-
tion improved on previous temporal estimates of the reversal event by a factor of three.
It revealed that disambiguation of ambiguous visual information takes roughly 50ms or
two loops of recurrent neural activity. Further, the decision about the perceptual outcome
has taken place at least 340ms before the observer is able to indicate the consciously
perceived reversal manually.We provide a short review about physiological studies on mul-
tistable perception with a focus on electrophysiological data. We further present a new
perspective on multistable perception that can easily integrate previous apparently con-
tradicting explanatory approaches. Finally we propose possible extensions toward other
research ﬁelds where ambiguous ﬁgure perception may be useful as an investigative tool.
Keywords: ambiguous ﬁgures, multistable perception, Necker cube, old/young woman, EEG/ERP, event-related
potentials, reversal positivity, reversal negativity
INTRODUCTION
Normally we experience our visual world as stable and unambigu-
ous – it seems to be as we see it. Numerous optical illusions (Bach,
1997), however, demonstrate that the information provided via
our eyes is restricted, thus incomplete and often ambiguous. Our
perceptual system needs to disambiguate and interpret it in order
to construct stable unambiguous percepts that allow us to success-
fully act in our environment. Extreme cases are ambiguous ﬁgures,
like the classical Necker cube (Figure 1A, Necker, 1832) or Borings
Old/Young woman (Figure 1C, Boring, 1930), designed to render
two (or even more) perceptual interpretations about equally prob-
able (indicated in Figures 1B,D). Another example is binocular
rivalry, where the observer’s two eyes see different images (Blake,
1989, 2001). In all of these cases the brain states corresponding
to the two interpretations become unstable and spontaneous per-
ceptual reversals can occur although the external stimulus stays
unchanged.
Ambiguous ﬁgures can be found in any textbook about cogni-
tive sciences and neuroscience. The perspective to experimentally
separate perceptual interpretation – which changes periodically –
from the earliest steps of visual processing – which should stay
unchanged, like the visual input – has attracted scientists from
various disciplines in the ﬁeld. It is believed that understand-
ing the mechanisms underlying the perceptual reversal or ﬁnding
the location(s) of the switch between sensory and perceptual
processing may help to understand how the activity pattern of
sensory receptors is translated into a complex representation of
the perceptual world (perceptual organization, e.g., Pomerantz
and Kubovy, 1981), how this representation is realized neurally
(object representation) and how it gets conscious (e.g., Crick and
Koch, 1998; Blake and Logothetis, 2002; Dehaene and Changeux,
2011).
We will here review the ﬁndings from physiological studies on
ambiguous ﬁgures with a speciﬁc focus on EEG studies. Based on
the results available so far we will propose a new perspective on the
phenomenon, which easily integrates approaches that appeared to
be contradictory so far.
Scientiﬁc studies of perceptual instability phenomena have
been carried out for nearly 200 years and explanations so far fol-
lowed two main traditions, namely the bottom-up (or sensory)
and the top-down (or cognitive) explanatory approaches.
The bottom-up approach assumes that perceptual reversals
result from cycles of passive adaptation, recovery, andmutual inhi-
bition of competing neural units or channels in early visual areas
(e.g., Köhler, 1940; Toppino and Long, 1987). There is plenty of
experimental evidence for this approach and some key ﬁndings
are listed below:
Several studies demonstrated local (retinotopic) adaptation
effects (e.g., Howard and Durham, 1961; Long et al., 1992; Long
and Olszweski, 1999), effects of stimulus features (e.g., Washburn
et al., 1931; Ammons and Ammons, 1963), and of presentation
mode (e.g., Orbach et al., 1963; Kornmeier et al., 2007) on the
initial percept and the reversal dynamics of ambiguous ﬁgures.
The top-down approach, in apparent contrast, assumes per-
ceptual reversals as the result from active high-level/cognitive
processes like attention, expectation, decision-making, and learn-
ing (Gregory, 1974; Rock et al., 1994b; Leopold and Logo-
thetis, 1999). Some key ﬁndings supporting this approach are:
(1) Although the bottom-up approach implies regular oscilla-
tions between the two interpretations, the durations of successive
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FIGURE 1 | Examples of ambiguous ﬁgures and their disambiguated
variants. (A)The Necker cube (Necker, 1832) and (B) disambiguated
versions with depth cues and a lightning model. (C) Outline version of
Borings Old/Young woman ﬁgure (Boring, 1930) adapted from Gale and
Findlay (1983) and (D) disambiguated old (left) and young woman ﬁgure
(right).
intervals of transiently stable percepts (“dwell times”) are unpre-
dictable and show characteristics of a stochastic process (e.g.,
ﬁt to gamma distribution, Borsellino et al., 1972; Murata et al.,
2003; Brascamp et al., 2005). According to Leopold and Logothetis
(1999) this is a signature of high-level exploratory behavior. (2)
Perceptual reversals are very rare or even absent,whenobservers do
not know that alternative interpretational possibilities exist (e.g.,
Girgus et al., 1977; Rock et al., 1994a), a ﬁnding hard to recon-
cile with fully automatic adaptation processes. Further, the rate of
reversals can be modulated volitionally, although they cannot be
prevented totally (e.g., Liebert andBurk, 1985; Strüber and Stadler,
1999).
While most of the authors so far exclusively favored either
a bottom-up or a top-down explanation, more and more stud-
ies indicate that both classes of factors play important roles and
must be integrated in an explanation of the phenomenon (e.g.,
Hochberg and Peterson, 1987; Blake and Logothetis, 2002; Tong
et al., 2006; Kornmeier et al., 2009; Bartels and Logothetis, 2010).
EEG STUDIES AND THE TIME REFERENCE PROBLEM
The EEG allows millisecond resolution of neural processes under-
lying perceptual reversals and thus may provide the necessary
temporal precision to resolve the debate about whether low-level
bottom-up or high-level/cognitive processes are at work. However
a precise time reference is necessary for EEGanalysis but difﬁcult to
establish because of the endogenous character of the reversal event.
Two major strategies have evolved to circumvent this problem,
both with advantages and disadvantages. In the following we will
discuss the relevant studies and relate their results to each other.
THE “MANUAL RESPONSE PARADIGM” – USING MANUAL RESPONSE
AS TIME REFERENCE
The principal idea is to present an ambiguous stimulus contin-
uously and use participants’ manual indications of perceptual
reversals as time reference to analyze the data in a certain interval
backward in time. Typical control intervals in manual response
studies were periods of stable percept (e.g., Basar-Eroglu et al.,
1996) and spontaneous EEG intervals during ﬁxation of a ﬁxa-
tion target (e.g., Strüber et al., 2001). Spontaneous key presses not
related to perceptual reversals were considered as control for EEG
components related to motor preparation and execution (Basar-
Eroglu et al., 1993). This paradigm has been applied in a number
of studies and the results are summarized in the following:
P300-like parietal positivity
Apositive event-related potential (ERP)with a right parietalmaxi-
mum(P4 electrode,“parietal positivity”) occurred≈250msbefore
key press with reversals of motion direction of the stroboscopic
alternative motion (SAM) stimulus (Schiller, 1933; Basar-Eroglu
et al., 1993; Strüber and Herrmann, 2002) and with orientation
reversals of the Necker cube (Strüber et al., 2001; Mathes et al.,
2006). This parietal positivity was interpreted as a variant of the
well-known cognitive P300 ERP component (e.g., Pritchard, 1981;
Verleger et al., 2005) and thus taken as evidence for top-down
processes. Strüber and Herrmann (2002) compared MEG activity
during endogenousmotion reversals of the SAMwith exogenously
induced motion reversals of disambiguated SAM variants (the two
dots moved concurrently either horizontally or vertically in the
same direction). They found a reversal-related parietal positivity
both for endogenous as well as for exogenously induced motion
reversals. Given reaction times from their unambiguous stimulus
conditions of about 550ms, the authors assumed that their parietal
positivity occurs subsequent to the motion reversal and reﬂects its
conscious recognition.
Alpha-band power decrease
I˙s¸og˘lu-Alkaç (2000) used the Necker cube in their study and
reported a decrease of alpha-band power in the time range of
the parietal positivity compared to alpha activity during a time
range immediately before. The authors argue that because alpha-
power decrease occurs with active brain states while alpha-power
increase with passive states of decreased cortical excitability, alpha
power (8–16Hz) decrease together with the P300-like positiv-
ity indicate active cognitive processes during perceptual reversals
(I˙s¸og˘lu-Alkaç et al., 2000). Strüber and Herrmann (2002) found
a relatively constant value of alpha oscillation (10Hz) until it
suddenly drops between 300 and 200ms before button press
for exogenously induced SAM-motion reversal, and a continu-
ous decrease in alpha activity within 1000ms before key press for
endogenous reversals. They interpreted the latter as evidence for a
slow bottom-up destabilization of the active perceptual interpre-
tation compared to a sudden exogenously driven destabilization.
I˙s¸og˘lu-Alkaç and Strüber (2006) recently found that alpha-power
decrease is restricted to the lower alpha bands (6–10Hz) whereas
the upper alpha band (10–12Hz) was unaffected.
Gamma-band power increase
Basar-Eroglu et al. (1996) found (non-phase-locked) EEG gamma
band (30–50Hz) enhancement within 1000ms before key press
related to SAM reversals compared to perceptual stability (dur-
ing a time interval after key press) most prominent at the right
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frontal electrode position (F4). The results were interpreted as
evidence for cognitive destabilization processes underlying per-
ceptual reversals. Strüber et al. (2000) found higher SAM reversal-
related gamma activity (28–48Hz) for participants with high
reversal rates (reversals per time unit) compared to participants
with low reversal rates. The authors interpret their results as
further support for the involvement of attentional top-down pro-
cessing during endogenous motion reversals. Strüber et al. (2001)
conﬁrmed these results for the Necker cube.
In Mathes et al.’s (2006) study participants had to volitionally
either speed upor slowdown the reversal rate or keep a passive atti-
tude toward a Necker cube stimulus. The authors reported higher
amplitude of the P300-like positivity and higher gamma activity
(28–48Hz) during the slow down condition than during the speed
up condition.
Summary
Taking the above studies together, gamma power increases and
alpha-power decreases in a time interval 1000ms before partici-
pants’ manual indication of perceptual reversals of an ambiguous
ﬁgure. Between 500 and 250ms before key press a parietal positiv-
ity occurs which is interpreted as indicating conscious recognition
of a perceptual reversal. The reversal event itself then must have
occurred earlier.
PROBLEMS OF THE MANUAL RESPONSE PARADIGM
EEG results from the manual response paradigm suggest that
endogenous perceptual reversals take place between 1000 and
550ms before observers’ manual response. However, the available
data can easily be interpreted either in bottom-up or top-down
direction.
Further, as the authors emphasize, manual reaction times
strongly vary both intra-individually and inter-individually
(Strüber et al., 2000; Strüber and Herrmann, 2002). Recently we
estimated the amount of reaction time variance related to orienta-
tion reversals of aNecker cube (Kornmeier andBach, 2004b) in the
following way: using depth cues,we created two unambiguous and
thus perceptually stable variants of the Necker cube (Figure 1B).
These appeared in random order, and participants indicated per-
ceived orientation reversals with a key press. Median reaction time
from ﬁve subjects was 616ms with an interquartile range from 530
to 733ms. ERP example traces (±SEM) from the occipital location
(Oz) of one participant are seen in Figure 2A: When the EEG is
averagedwith respect to the exogenous stimulus reversal (continu-
ous vertical line), sharply deﬁned ERP components result (dashed
vertical line indicates the median reaction time). Figure 2B:When
the same EEG is “backward averaged” with respect to the par-
ticipant’s response, the early visual ERP components are largely
obliterated. It is thus likely, and indeed we will show that endoge-
nous reversals are accompanied by ERP structures earlier than the
parietal positivity that can be indentiﬁed only with a more precise
time reference.
THE ONSET PARADIGM: STIMULUS ONSET AS TIME REFERENCE
The onset paradigm goes back to the work of the Orbach group
(e.g., Orbach et al., 1963; Orbach et al., 1966). They presented a
Necker cube discontinuously, varied presentation time and inter-
stimulus interval (ISI) and found that reversal rates are modulated
FIGURE 2 | Estimating manual reaction time variance. Participants
observed unambiguous cubes (similar to Figure 1B) that randomly reversed
(16 times per minute on the average) and indicated manually each
perceived orientation reversal. (A) ERP traces (±SEM) from the occipital
location of one participant with the exogenous reversal instance as time
reference for averaging (vertical line) are seen. Sharply deﬁned early ERP
components result; the reaction time is widely scattered (200ms
interquartile range; dashed line indicates median reaction time). (B)The
same EEG data averaged backward with reaction times as time references
(vertical line). The early visual ERP components are largely obliterated. Only
the late positivity is roughly similar to (A). The Onset Paradigm (Figure 4)
avoided this problem.
in a non-monotonic manner mainly as a function of ISI. Figure 3
depicts their data together with data from our own lab (Kornmeier
et al., 2002).
As can be seen, for ISIs shorter than about 400ms reversal
rates increase monotonically up to more than twice the rate dur-
ing continuous observation. After 400ms a monotonic decrease
of reversal rates can be observed. Reversals can even be brought
to stand still with ISIs in the range of seconds (Leopold et al.,
2002; Maier et al., 2003). Most relevant for EEG studies is that
reversals occurred typically near stimulus onset if the presentation
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FIGURE 3 | Reversal rate as a function of ISI. Reversal rates with
continuous and discontinuous presentations of ambiguous Necker stimuli
from different studies. Reversal rates behave non-monotonically, increasing
with ISI up to 400ms. Thereafter they decrease with further increasing ISIs.
(Fig from Kornmeier et al., 2007, modiﬁed).
time was short enough (Orbach et al., 1966). Stimulus onset thus
promised to be a more precise time reference of the reversal event
than reaction times.
O’Donnell et al. (1988) were the ﬁrst study to use stimulus
onset as time reference for averaging EEG data. In two condi-
tions participants viewed the ambiguous Necker cube and (appar-
ently) unambiguous cube variants for 700ms followed by ISIs of
3300ms. After each stimulus offset they indicated their previous
percept by pressing one of two possible keys. In the case of the
ambiguous Necker cube, perceptual reversals between two suc-
cessive stimulus presentations were purely endogenous, whereas
in the case of the unambiguous cube variants perceptual rever-
sals were regarded as exogenously induced by stimulus alterna-
tions. The authors compared reversal trials with non-reversal
trials and found a late parietal/frontal positivity for both exoge-
nously induced and endogenous perceptual reversals. In the case
of exogenously induced reversals this positivity was larger and
occurred earlier (around 550ms after stimulus onset) compared
to endogenous reversals (around 650ms after onset).
Identifying O’Donnell et al.’s (1988) positivity with the posi-
tivity found with the Manual Response Paradigm and accepting
Strüber and Herrmann’s (2002) hypothesis about the positivity
as an index of conscious realization of the reversal, O’Donnell et
al.’s data restrict the reversal event to a time window of 650ms
between stimulus onset and the late positivity. Further, the similar
results of O’Donnell et al.’s (1988) illusory and physical reversal
conditions suggest similar processes underlying endogenous and
exogenously induced perceptual reversals.
O’Donnell et al.’s (1988) data provide a sizable improvement
on temporal precision, but some limitations have to be faced: (1)
Their “unambiguous” cube variants are not really unambiguous.
They can easily be perceived in two different orientations as either
inside or outside corners of a box. (2) The non-monotonic charac-
ter of the reversal rate as a function of ISI (Figure 3) suggests two
separate processes, one responsible for the increasing part of the
function (reversals during continuous observation and with short
interruptions, Figure 3, left part), and another responsible for the
decreasing part (perceptual reversals with long ISIs, Figure 3 right
part). O’Donnell et al.’s choice of 3300ms ISI places their reversals
to the second type and thus raises doubts about whether they are
a good model for the continuous case (see also below).
(3) A perceptual reversal during continuous observation of an
ambiguous ﬁgure involves an implicit comparison of the current
with the previous (different) percept, thus working memory may
play a role (e.g., Pearson and Brascamp, 2008). In O’Donnell et
al.’s (1988) study participants were instructed to report their per-
cept of each presentation. Comparisons across presentations were
not necessary. This task together with the relatively long ISIs may
have allowed separate percepts of cube stimuli at each stimulus
presentation instead of perceptual reversal experiences.
We adopted O’Donnell et al. (1988)’s paradigm but modiﬁed it
in the following ways (Figure 4):
(a) Optimizing presentation time and ISI: We shortened our ISI
to 400ms to be as close to the continuous viewing condition as
possible while concurrently enablingmanual responseswithin
the ISI. Presentation time was set to 800ms, long enough
to allow the full development of a P300-like positivity and
short enough to keep the probability of additional perceptual
reversals later during the presentation interval low.
(b) Comparison task across presentations: Our participants com-
pared in a go/nogo task the perceived front-back orienta-
tion of the current Necker lattice (a combination of nine
Necker cubes, Figure 4) with that of the preceding one in
two experimental conditions. In one condition they pressed
a key whenever the currently perceived orientation differed
from the preceding one (“reversal condition”). The second,
control condition was identical except that the task was the
opposite: participants indicated when they perceived orien-
tation of the stimulus as remaining the same (“stability con-
dition”). All manual responses were executed in the ISI after
the relevant percept in order to keep neural activity related
to motor-preparation and -execution as far away as possible
from the critical time interval of the reversal. Any ERP sig-
nature related to lower-level stimulus processing, afterimages,
or motor preparation should be identical in the two condi-
tions and should disappear after subtraction of the related
ERP traces from each other.
(c) Like O’Donnell et al. (1988) we exogenously induced orienta-
tion reversals of unambiguous stimulus variants in a second
experiment. Our unambiguous cube variants contained depth
cues, like shading, central perspective, and a lighting model
(Figure 1B, Woo et al., 1998).
Four types of ERP traces were calculated, related to (1) endoge-
nous perceptual reversals and (2) endogenous perceptual stability
of ambiguous Necker stimuli, (3) exogenously induced percep-
tual reversals, and (4) exogenously induced perceptual stability of
disambiguated stimulus variants.
THE PROCESSING CHAIN OF PERCEPTUAL REVERSALS
According to our null hypothesis, the EEG traces from the reversal
and stability conditions should not differ, because both conditions
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FIGURE 4 | Onset paradigm. Participants viewed in different experiments
either unambiguous lattices (A,B) or ambiguous Necker lattices (C,D) and
compared the 3D perspective of successively presented stimuli. In separate
experimental conditions they indicated in a go/nogo task either a perceived
perspective reversal [reversal conditions in (A,C)] or perceived stability
[stability conditions in (B,D)] across two successive stimulus presentations by
a key press in the ISI following the respective perceptual event. Each key
press extended the current ISI from 400 to 1000ms.
contain identical stimuli, a comparison task, a mental decision,
and aspects of response preparation. Further, the amount of
required attention to execute the task should be equal in the two
conditions.
The difference traces (“dERP,” reversal condition minus sta-
bility condition) should thus be ﬂat and any residuum would be
related to the perceptual reversal aspect. Indeed we did ﬁnd a
series of reversal related modulations in lower (dERP) as well as
higher frequencies. Figure 5A presents the ERP traces from per-
ceptual reversal trials (interrupted lines) and perceptual stability
trials (continuous lines) on a schematic head (data from Korn-
meier and Bach, 2004b). Figure 9 presents the related (induced)
modulations at higher frequencies. Like in Figure 5, for each
electrode position a pair of graphs depicts data from the unam-
biguous lattice variants on bottom on a gray background and data
from the ambiguous lattices on top on a white background. The
electrode positions are indicated schematically in Figures 5B and
9B. At a ﬁrst glance ERP traces (Figure 5A) are very similar across
stimuli and conditions. Especially the P100 components as the
earliest visual responses after stimulus onset are roughly identi-
cal (Figure 6). The subsequent components match in latency but
differ in amplitude. These differences are better seen in the dif-
ference traces (dERPs, Figure 5C) and their temporal relations
are schematically presented in Figure 8. Likewise modulations at
higher frequency are very similar across averaged conditions and
experiments, and are depicted in the time–frequency charts in
Figure 9A. Most conspicuous is an initial power enhancement in
the alpha to beta range immediately after onset that quickly shifts
to the theta and lower alpha range where it sustains. Further, a sus-
tained beta deactivation starts about 100ms after stimulus onset
and spreads to thewhole beta and upper alpha band.Differences in
higher frequency power between conditions and experiments are
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FIGURE 5 | Grand mean ERPs (16 participants, baseline −60 to
+40ms). For each electrode position a pair of graphs contain data from
the unambiguous lattice variants in red on bottom on a gray background
and the data from the ambiguous lattices in blue on top on a white
background. Dashed vertical lines indicate stimulus onset, electrode
positions are indicated schematically in (B). (A) Raw ERPs before
subtraction.The global shapes of the ERP traces at each electrode are very
similar across conditions (reversal, dotted traces, and stability, continuous
traces) and across experiments (ambiguous and unambiguous stimuli).
This is especially true for the early visual ERP components at the occipital
electrode position). (C) Difference traces (reversal minus stability).
Differences ERPs (dERPs) are very similar between ambiguous and
unambiguous stimuli with two exceptions: (1) All dERPs found with
unambiguous stimuli occur earlier and (2) the early occipital Reversal
Positivity (RP) is restricted to endogenous perceptual reversals of
ambiguous Necker lattices. Data from Kornmeier and Bach (2004b).
better seen in the difference time–frequency charts in Figure 9C
and their temporal relation schematically in Figure 10.
In the following we will discuss the individual dERP compo-
nents and related modulations at higher frequencies separately:
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FIGURE 6 | Grand mean ERP traces from the occipital electrode
position. As can be seen, the early visual ERP components are very similar
across conditions (reversal, dotted traces and stability, continuous traces)
and experiments (Necker lattices, blue, and unambiguous variants, red).
Data from Kornmeier and Bach (2004b).
SIGNATURES SPECIFIC FOR ENDOGENOUS REVERSALS OF
AMBIGUOUS FIGURES
Reversal positivity
The reversal positivity (RP) occurs around 130ms after stimulus
onset, is most prominent at occipital electrode positions and
restricted to endogenous reversals of the ambiguous stimuli. So
far it has been reported by studies using the Onset Paradigm
with Necker lattices (Kornmeier and Bach, 2005, 2006; Korn-
meier et al., 2007; Britz et al., 2009), with the classical Necker cube
(Kornmeier et al., 2011), with Borings (1930) Old/Young Woman
(Figure 1C, Kornmeier and Bach, 2004a) and recently even with
binocular rivalry stimuli (Britz and Pitts, 2011). Pitts et al. (2007)
found modulations in the P1 ERP component during reversals of
the Vase/Face stimulus and Schroeder’s staircase stimulus ﬁtting
with polarity and time window of the RP. Britz and Pitts recently
discussed the RP as a modulation of the P1 component and local-
ized it in “primary visual areas” (Britz and Pitts, 2011). Recent
evidence from our lab suggests, however, that P1 and RP are dif-
ferent components (Kornmeier et al., 2011) suggesting that the
P1 effect in Pitts et al. (2007) may be a superimposed RP. Pitts
et al. (2008) and Intaite et al. (2010) did not ﬁnd a signiﬁcant RP
with perceived reversals of the Necker lattice. In the latter study
a strongly modiﬁed variant of the Onset Paradigm (e.g., reversals
from unambiguous to ambiguous lattices) may be the reason. Pitts
et al. (2009) did not analyze the data in the RP time window.
A possible explanation for the remaining inhomogeneity of
results may be the following: The RP is a small component typi-
cally with amplitudes around or even below 1μV (e.g., Kornmeier
and Bach, 2005; Kornmeier and Bach, 2006; Britz et al., 2009). A
critical parameter for its statistical validity is the signal-to-noise
ratio and thus the number of EEG trials per subject that enter the
ERP calculation. This was between 100 and 120 per condition in
our studies. Britz et al. (2009) reported about 52 trials per condi-
tion and participant on average. In Pitts et al.’s (2007, 2008) studies
the number of trials was down to 30 and below. Their absolute
number of trials (not reported) may have been large enough to let
a positive deﬂection appear but too low to render it signiﬁcant1
(Luck, 2005; Pitts et al., 2007).
In studies using the Manual Response Paradigm the RP was
probably obliterated due to reaction time variability. This would
imply that reaction times are considerably less precise compared to
stimulus onset as time reference.We estimated the precision of the
Onset Paradigm in the following way: The earliest ERP response
after stimulus onset, the P100, occurred in our data 80ms after
onset with a peak width of ±20ms and was regarded as a low-level
ERP and fully synchronized to stimulus onset. In comparison, the
RP is the earliest reversal-related dERP component has a peak
width of about ±35ms. Let us now assume that it results from a
convolution of the variance producing the P100-width with the
variance producing the Reversal Positivity. Assuming a Gaussian
peak shape, the unknown width of the temporal variance would
be equal to:
Temporal variance of the reversal instance =
√(
352 — 202
) ≈ 30
(based on additivity of variances)
Thus endogenous perceptual reversals were synchronized with
stimulus onset with a precision of about ±30ms, an improvement
of more than a factor of three over the manual response reference
(Figure 7).
Early alpha modulations
A left-hemispheric power reduction in the alpha band (8–15Hz)
ranging from the occipital to frontopolar electrode (Component
A5 in Figures 9 and 10) shows some similarities to the RP and may
thus be related: Both (1) start around 130ms, (2) are restricted
to endogenous reversals, and (3) have an opposite sign as the
subsequent components.
Interpretation of the RP: decision conﬂict during interpretation
of ambiguous information. In summary, the RP shows three
interesting features:
(1) It is restricted to endogenous reversals.
(2) It occurs relatively “early” during visual processing, which is
reﬂected in its latency and its spatial distribution at occipi-
tal electrodes. For discontinuous stimulus presentation, early
is well deﬁned as occurring with short latency after stimulus
onset. But what would early mean for perceptual reversals
during continuous observation? Here early and late can be
alternatively deﬁned as temporal distance from reaction time.
Reaction times can be estimated with ambiguous ﬁgures using
the Onset Paradigm and instructing participants to respond
1The multiple testing problem is inherent to the analysis of EEG data. Depending
on the number of tests, corrections for alpha-error-inﬂation can strongly reduce
test-sensitivity, especially in cases of small signals like with the Reversal Positivity.
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org March 2012 | Volume 6 | Article 51 | 7
Kornmeier and Bach Ambiguous ﬁgures
FIGURE 7 | Estimation of the temporal precision with the Onset
Paradigm. Continuous trace: Grand mean ERP trace from the occipital
electrode in the reversal condition in the P100 time window. Dotted trace:
Grand Mean dERP trace from the occipital electrode position in the time
window of the RP. The dERP trace is shifted on the time scale in order to
align the RP with the P100 and thus to simplify peak-with comparison. Data
from Kornmeier and Bach (2005).
immediately after perceived reversals. Substituting the rever-
sal instance with stimulus onset and assuming that reversals
occur only after stimulus onset, the upper limit of reaction
time to endogenous reversals is in the range of 600ms (Korn-
meier and Bach, 2006). Thus the RP occurs roughly 470ms
before the manual indication of a perceived reversal (Korn-
meier and Bach, 2006). In perceptual processing times 470ms
is very long and thus the RP can also be labelled as early from
this point of view.
(3) The RP occurs with different types of ambiguous stimuli
(Necker cube,Necker lattice,Old/Young woman stimulus and
even with binocular rivalry stimuli). This indicates gener-
ality across low-level stimulus features and across stimulus
types. Further, the RP differs from the spatiotemporal close
P1 (Kornmeier et al., 2011).
Currently we regard the RP as an indicator of the visual sys-
tem’s “detection” of ambiguity, or the related decision conﬂict at
a certain processing level during perceptual organization (Pomer-
antz and Kubovy, 1981) where the ambiguity gets evident. For the
Necker cube the identiﬁcation of line orientations and their bind-
ing together would be low-level steps and perhaps related to the
C1 and P1 ERP components (discussed in Kornmeier et al., 2011).
Ambiguity occurs subsequently during the interpretation of acute
and obtuse angles as orthogonal and the allocation of depth values
to the different square planes. Here a perceptual decision has to be
made and the RP may reﬂect the related conﬂict or its detection.
Two questions arise immediately from this speculation:
(1) In the case of the Necker cube the stimulus information is
always ambiguous. Why should there be a difference in deal-
ing with this ambiguity in reversal and stability trials (remind
that the RP is a dERP, resulting from the subtraction of stabil-
ity ERP traces from reversal ERP traces)? A possible answer to
this question may be the following: All sensory information
is incomplete and to some degree ambiguous. Our perceptual
system uses (amongst other strategies) past perceptual expe-
riences (on various time scales) to disambiguate and interpret
this information. Several adaptation and priming studies sup-
port this view (e.g., Long et al., 1992; Woerner et al., 2009).
The above mentioned decision conﬂict need not occur if the
perceptual system is already strongly biased in favor of one
(e.g., the previous) percept at the moment the ambiguous
stimulus appears. This may be the case in our stability tri-
als. We have estimated the disambiguation time in the case
of a decision conﬂict with the Necker lattice as 40–70ms
(Kornmeier and Bach, 2006, see also below). If our above
speculation is correct, then reaction times should be delayed
by this amount in the reversal trials, where a conﬂict arises
and disambiguation is necessary, compared to the stability
trials without conﬂict. This is indeed what we recently found
(Kornmeier et al., 2011).
FIGURE 8 | Schematic time scale of endogenous and exogenous
dERP components. dERP components are indicated by rectangles. The
vertical dashed line indicates the P100 as earliest occipital ERP
component before subtraction. Negative values on the time axis reﬂect
the time period of the ISI before stimulus onset. Data from Kornmeier
and Bach (2004b, 2006).
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FIGURE 9 | Grand mean EEG time–frequency charts. For each
electrode position a pair of time–frequency charts contain data from the
unambiguous lattice variants (bottom, grey background) and the data from
the ambiguous lattices (above, white background). Dashed vertical lines
mark the stimulus onset. (A) Raw time–frequency charts. Grand mean
time–frequency charts were obtained by averaging data across
participants and conditions. Electrode positions are indicated
schematically in (B). (C) Differences of grand mean EEG time–frequency
charts (reversal minus stability). Entries in (B) (e.g., A1, U2, . . .) indicate
the position of signiﬁcant deﬂections from zero in the time–frequency
plane. A, ambiguous; U, unambiguous; numbers indicate the temporal
order of effects; black/white colouring of the numbers and letters is only
for saliency. Most remarkable is the gamma band modulation before onset
of the ambiguous Necker stimulus (deﬂection A1 at electrodes P4 and C4
and Cz; and deﬂection A2 at electrode Oz). No such modulation occurs
with the unambiguous stimulus variants. (from Ehm et al., 2011, Figure 2).
(2) Disambiguation of incoming information as described above
makes sense if the stimulus reappears periodically after a
blank screen interval and a percept has to be created. But
how can this be translated to the continuous case? There is
accumulating evidence that perception is discontinuous and
that our impression of perceptual continuity is an illusion
(e.g., Dubois and Vanrullen, 2011). According to this view
some neural instances would “perceive” a discontinuously
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FIGURE 10 | Schematic display of signiﬁcant components from the
time–frequency analyses.The black dots within the schematic heads mark
electrode positions. The closed polygons surrounding electrode positions
mark signiﬁcant test results, their color indicates the corresponding frequency
range. Head positions on the time axes indicate peak time. Positive and
(negative) excursions appear above (below) the time axes. Top: Necker
stimulus; bottom: unambiguous stimulus. Gray backgrounds highlight
analogies between ambiguous and unambiguous stimuli. Their temporal
difference is consistent with dERP results. Pre-onset gamma modulations (A1
and A2) are restricted to the Necker stimuli.
presented stimulus similarly to a continuously presented
stimulus (given a certain frequency). Some (potentially higher
level) updating instance may periodically re-evaluate and re-
interpret the visual input in order to notice environmental
changes. Thus, periodic decisions and decision conﬂicts may
also arise during continuous observation of an ambiguous
ﬁgure. Such a concept had already been proposed in top-
down explanation approaches (e.g., Vickers, 1972; Leopold
and Logothetis, 1999) and also in a recent Necker-Zeno Model
for Bistable Perception (Atmanspacher et al., 2004, 2008).
Accordingly, the RP should not only occur with the Onset Par-
adigm but also with spontaneous reversals of a continuously
presentated ambiguous ﬁgure. And it should be detectable
if a sufﬁciently precise time reference were available with
continuous stimulus presentation. Additional experiments
with ambiguous ﬁgures from other categories (e.g., appar-
ent motion, ﬁgure-background stimuli) need to further test
the generality of the RP.
Interpretation of the alpha-power reduction: disambiguation
time. The left-hemispheric reduction of alpha-power starts at the
latency of the RP (130ms), it extends from posterior to anterior
sites and lasts for about 60ms (Figures 9 and 10). Modulation of
alpha activity is discussed in the contexts of change from a resting
state to excitation/activation, attention and top-down modulation
of perceptual processing, execution of cognitive tasks or temporal
segmentation of perception and consciousness (for a review, see
Palva and Palva, 2007). In the current experiment the alpha reduc-
tion may indicate recurrent activity between occipital and frontal
areas to resolve the ambiguity and the related decision conﬂict
indicated by the RP. It may thus reﬂect a disambiguation time of
roughly 60ms in the case of the Necker lattice. Interestingly, Foxe
and Simpson (2002) indicated that in humans visual information
needs only about 30ms from striate to prefrontal cortex. Two loops
of recurrent activity thus seem to be sufﬁcient to disambiguate the
Necker lattice.
SIGNATURES OCCURRING WITH BOTH EXOGENOUSLY INDUCED AND
ENDOGENOUS REVERSALS
Reversal negativity
The reversal negativity (RN) is the ﬁrst dERP component found
with both endogenous reversals of the Necker lattices and exoge-
nously induced reversals of the unambiguous lattice variants.
It occurs roughly 220ms after stimulus onset with exogenously
induced reversals and about 40ms later at 260mswith endogenous
reversals (Kornmeier and Bach, 2006; Intaite et al., 2010; Figure 8).
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This component has been reported in all studies using the onset
paradigm (Kornmeier and Bach, 2004b, 2005, 2006; Kornmeier
et al., 2007, 2011; Pitts et al., 2007, 2008, 2009; Britz et al., 2009;
Intaite et al., 2010; Britz and Pitts, 2011). Source analysis revealed
locations in the lateral occipital and inferior temporal areas (Pitts
et al., 2009; Britz and Pitts, 2011).
There are, however, some differences concerning the temporal
extent and the spatial distribution of the RN. These differences
may be traced back to differences in the experimental paradigm
concerning the time window of participants’ responses. In some
studies the participants were allowed to respond immediately after
a perceived reversal, i.e., already during the stimulus presentation
period. In those cases the negative dERP componentwas both tem-
porally and spatially extended (e.g., Pitts et al., 2008; Intaite et al.,
2010; Kornmeier et al., 2011) compared to the case when responses
were only allowed in the ISI following a perceived reversal. In the
latter case thenegative dERPcomponentwas shorter and restricted
to occipital/parietal locations (e.g., Kornmeier and Bach, 2004b;
Kornmeier andBach, 2005). Kornmeier et al. (2007) demonstrated
that in the cases of immediate responses (already in the stimulus
presentation interval) the occipital/parietal RN is superimposed
by a residual Bereitschaftspotential, which occurs later (at about
300ms after onset) and which has a distribution from parietal to
frontal positions. Elbert et al. (1985) have previously shown inﬂu-
ence of psychological variables on the Bereitschaftspotential in the
context of perceptual reversals of the Necker cube.
Interpretation of the RN. So far the functional role of the RN
is unclear. It’s role as an indicator of top-down inﬂuence of the
reversal process (e.g., Pitts et al., 2008) and its potential identity
with the spatiotemporally very similar SelectionNegativity (Anllo-
Vento and Hillyard, 1996) are in discussion (Kornmeier and Bach,
2004b; Pitts et al., 2008; Intaite et al., 2010). A speciﬁc role for the
RN in endogenous perceptual reversals can be ruled out by the
fact that it also occurs when perceptual reversals are exogenously
driven by a physical stimulus change (Kornmeier and Bach, 2006).
Interestingly, the RN’s spatial location seems to be related to the
stimulus type. It is most prominent at occipital/parietal locations
with cube type stimuli whereas it seems to be more dominant
at temporal locations in the case of Boring’s old/young woman
(Kornmeier and Bach, 2004a).
Frontopolar and parietal positivities
The Frontopolar Positivity follows the RN. It is most prominent at
the frontopolar electrode and occurs 300ms after stimulus onset
in the case of exogenously induced reversals, and 40ms later at
340ms in the case of endogenous reversals (Figures 5C and 8). No
source analysis of this component has been done so far.
The Parietal Positivity follows the Frontopolar Positivity. It is
maximal at parietal electrodes and occurs 400ms after stimulus
onset with exogenously induced reversals and about 70ms later at
470ms in the case of endogenous reversals. Most of the ERP stud-
ies using the Onset Paradigm reported a reversal-related parietal
positivity with very similar spatiotemporal patterns (e.g., Korn-
meier and Bach, 2004b; Pitts et al., 2008; Britz et al., 2009). It was
recently localized in the bilateral superior and middle temporal
as well as left inferior frontal areas (Britz and Pitts, 2011). Some
studies did not discern between Frontopolar and Parietal Posi-
tivities and regarded them as one and the same component with
a parietal to frontopolar extent (e.g., Britz et al., 2009; Britz and
Pitts, 2011). Pitts et al. (2008) reported a frontal positive compo-
nent at around 300ms and interpreted it as a “selection positivity,”
i.e., a sign-inverted frontal counterpart of the occipital/parietal
Selection Negativity (Anllo-Vento and Hillyard, 1996).
Interpretation of the frontopolar positivity. Recentlywe found in
our data strong evidence in support of two separate positive com-
ponents:With our go–nogo variant of theOnset Paradigmwewere
able to differ between manually indicated reversal events (rever-
sal percepts in the reversal condition, i.e., go trials) and reversal
events without indication (reversal percepts in the stability con-
ditions, i.e., nogo trials) – and with the same logic corresponding
stability events. The dERPs from the go trials showed a decrease
of a positivity at 400ms and a increase of a positivity at 300ms
from parietal to frontopolar electrode positions in the case of the
unambiguous lattices (Figure 11C: from bright to dark colors).
This is similarly indicated but less pronounced with the ambigu-
ous lattices with the above mentioned latency shifts (Figure 11A).
In contrast, the dERPs related to the nogo trials showed a sim-
ple amplitude reduction from parietal to frontopolar electrodes
without any difference in latency (Figures 11B,D). Thus, the Fron-
topolar Positivity is absent in the nogo trials. This observation
decouples the Frontopolar Positivity both from the Parietal Pos-
itivity and the RN and may indicate a role of working memory
related to the delayed response in the subsequent ISIs of the go tri-
als – no delayed response and thus no related memory is necessary
in the nogo trials. This interpretation suggests that some response-
related brain instance must already know about the perceptual
outcome at 300ms (unambiguous lattices) or 340ms (ambiguous
lattices). More research is necessary to test this interpretation of
the Frontopolar Positivity.
Interpretation of the parietal positivity. So far all electrophysio-
logical studies on ambiguous ﬁgures report a slow positivity with
parietal to frontal dominance. With the Onset Paradigm such a
positivity occurs between 400 and 500ms after stimulus onset and
between 100 and 150ms before the manual response (e.g., Korn-
meier andBach,2006; Pitts et al., 2009).With theManual Response
Paradigm a slow positivity peaks roughly 250ms before the man-
ual response. Assuming that both paradigms identiﬁed the same
component, the mismatch between latencies of about 100ms may
result from (1) different time references for averaging (stimulus
onset or reaction instances) together with a temporal coupling
asymmetry of this component to the two time references and (2) a
merging of the Frontopolar with the Parietal Positivity in the case
of backward averaging from manual responses.
Several authors identiﬁed the Parietal Positivity with the well-
known P3b component, which typically occurs in oddball par-
adigms (Picton, 1992), and indeed Verleger et al. (2005) demon-
strated the persistence of the classical P3b across onset and reaction
time as time references for averaging. The interpretations of the
Parietal Positivity range from (1) indication of attentional and
cognitive processes during a perceptual reversal (O’Donnell et al.,
1988) or (2) following it (I˙s¸og˘lu-Alkac et al., 2000), (3) closure
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FIGURE 11 | Parietal and frontopolar positivities (dERPs) along the
midline electrodes. (A,C)Temporally and spatially separated Parietal and
Frontopolar Positivities occur in the go trials. (B,D)The Frontopolar Positivity,
however, is absent in the no–go trials. Instead, the amplitude of the Parietal
Positivity decreases from parietal to frontopolar positions, while its latency
stays unchanged (Data from Kornmeier and Bach, 2004b).
of the switching process (Strüber et al., 2001), or (4) cogni-
tive/conscious recognition or appraisal of the reversal (Strüber
and Herrmann, 2002; Kornmeier and Bach, 2006; Britz and
Pitts, 2011). The following consideration supports the cognitive
appraisal/visual awareness hypothesis from above: The minimal
reaction time with the simplest auditory task (faster than visual) is
in the range of 150ms (Debecker and Desmedt, 1970). This gives
an upper limit for a pure motor execution after the conscious
response decision has taken place. It ﬁts well with our average
temporal distance between the Parietal Positivity and the manual
reaction and thus may place the moment of conscious experi-
ence of the perceptual change (and the decision to indicate this)
roughly at the latency of the Parietal Positivity. Further support
comes from several ERP studies on ERP correlates of conscious-
ness. There, a P3b occurs if perceptual processing of a stimulus
reaches consciousness, whereas this component is absent, when
the stimulus stays subliminal (Dehaene and Changeux, 2011, for a
recent review).
Beta and gamma modulations common to both endogenous and
exogenously induced reversals
All dERP components found with exogenously induced rever-
sals seem to occur also with endogenous reversals, however with
a temporal delay. A similar pattern of results can be observed
in the beta and gamma frequency range. In the case of exoge-
nously induced reversals a left-central increase in gamma activ-
ity at about 150ms (40–65Hz, Figures 9 and 10, component
A6) followed by a bilateral central increase in beta activity (14–
26Hz, Figures 9 and 10, component A7) at around 260ms can
be observed. Correspondingly, in the case of endogenous rever-
sals a left-central gamma increase starts at about 250ms and
thus 100ms later than the exogenous counterpart (Figures 9
and 10, component U2). An increase in beta activity follows
at around 320ms (Figures 9 and 10, component U3). Signif-
icance for the latter, however, is restricted to the right-central
electrode position. Although the pattern of results agrees less well
than the dERP components, which might partly be due to the
lower temporal resolution of time–frequency analyses compared
to ERPs, component A6 might be associated with component
U2 and the same may apply to components A7 and U3 (indi-
cated by a gray shading in Figure 10) and the temporal delay
between these components has the same sign as with the dERP
components.
Several studies using the Manual Response Paradigm reported
enhanced frontal gamma activity within 1000ms before the man-
ual response (e.g., Basar-Eroglu et al., 1996; Strüber et al., 2000).
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The gamma enhancement found with the Onset-Paradigm lies
within the above 1000-ms time interval and may reﬂect the
same neural processes. The spatial differences between gamma
enhancements and the missing beta effect with the Manual
Response Paradigm may be explained by different control con-
ditions.
Interpretation of the beta and gamma modulations. The
gamma-band modulation at 250ms is the earliest signature at
higher frequencies in the case of endogenous reversals with a
corresponding component from exogenously induced reversals.
Interestingly, its start matches well the latency of the RN, the earli-
est dERP component common to both types of reversal. According
to Kornmeier and Bach (2006) these ﬁndings indicate that at least
250ms after stimulus onset, the “decision” about the perceptual
outcome has taken place. Thus all signatures at 250ms and later
must be of secondary order and subsequent to the reversal process,
and the underlying processes must be very similar if not identical
for the two types of stimuli. Their detailed functional roles have
to be discovered in future experiments.
IS IT VALID TO ANALYZE COMPONENTS FROM DIFFERENCE TRACES?
Amplitude modulations in an ERP difference trace can result from
amodulation in strengthof components before subtractionor they
are simple artifacts from differential latency shifts of the under-
lying components in the two conditions. A combination of both
is also possible. Figures 5A and 6 show roughly equal latencies of
our raw ERP traces (before subtraction) across reversal and sta-
bility conditions for each of the two stimulus types. Analyzing the
dERPs thus seems to be valid.
Any EEG deﬂection, however, is a spatial summation of an
unknown number of differing generators. A component of a
difference trace can thus result from a complex and differential
interplay of different underlying generators in the two condi-
tions. Britz and Pitts (2011) thus additionally compared current
density maps and source images of raw ERPs and of dERPs. Fur-
ther they identiﬁed clusters of brain microstates (Lehmann and
Skrandies, 1980; Michel et al., 2004) with temporally stable global
ﬁeld power (spatial SD of the potential ﬁeld) and compared them
between the reversal, stability and difference traces. In summary
they found converging evidence that all the reversal-related sig-
natures reported above result from strength-based modulations
of stimulus-related neural generators. This qualiﬁes the stability
condition as a valid control and further validates the analysis of
the signatures from the difference traces.
ARE PERCEPTUAL REVERSALS DURING DISCONTINUOUS STIMULUS
PRESENTATION A GOOD MODEL FOR THE CONTINUOUS CASE?
The gain in temporal resolution of the endogenous reversal
process, allowing a high temporal resolution of ERP compo-
nents, comes at the cost of the periodical interruption of the
stimulus presentation. Noest et al. (2007) recently discussed exten-
sively whether the basic mechanisms of reversals induced by these
interruptions resemble or differ from the reversal mechanism
during continuous observation. They distinguished between“per-
cept switch” events during continuous presentation and “percept
choice” events during discontinuous presentation of an ambigu-
ous ﬁgure and present a model for the latter. A percept choice
was considered as a kind of perceptual decision about the rep-
resentation of an ambiguous stimulus appearing (and then dis-
appearing) on a blank screen. The underlying mechanisms were
assumed to differ from those of percept switch mechanisms,
i.e., reversals during continuous observation of an ambiguous
ﬁgure.
According to Noest et al. (2007), all ﬁndings with the Onset
Paradigm belong to the latter reversal type. It is not entirely
clear, however, how and when exactly (at which ISI) the transition
between percept choice and percept switch takes place. Based on
the following theoretical and empirical arguments, including the
data presented above, we argue that reversals during interrupted
stimulation with short ISIs (e.g., <400ms) may still belong to the
percept switch events and that the above-presented results from
the Onset Paradigm may also apply to the continuous case.
1. The empirical data show a non-monotonic modulation of
reversal rates mainly as a function of ISIs with a maximum
around an ISI of 300ms (Orbach et al., 1963, 1966; Kornmeier
et al., 2002), an asymptotic decrease toward zero reversals for
longer ISIs (e.g., Orbach et al., 1963; Orbach et al., 1966; Korn-
meier et al., 2002; Leopold et al., 2002; Maier et al., 2003),
and a smooth monotonic decrease of reversal rates toward the
continuous case for shorter ISIs (Orbach et al., 1963, 1966;
Kornmeier et al., 2002, 2007; see also Figure 3). This non-
monotonic behavior of reversal rates provides evidence for the
existence of two different processes and suggests an estimate
of roughly 400ms for the transition point. For shorter ISIs the
underlying processes may be similar to the continuous case to
which the observed reversal rates converge (switch events). For
ISIs above 400ms, perceptual reversals may be simply separate
percepts (choice events). The recently proposed Necker-Zeno
model of bistable perception (Atmanspacher et al., 2004, 2008)
lends additional, theoretical support to this view. It success-
fully models the non-monotonic behavior of reversal rates with
discontinuous stimulus presentations and predicts a simple
relation between three basic time scales in cognitive neuro-
science. ISIs of 300ms and longer can be identiﬁed with one
of these time scales, while for ISIs smaller than 300ms this is
not the case. A most recent summary of the results obtained
with the Necker-Zeno Model can be found in Atmanspacher
and Filk (2010).
2. The RP, as a dERP component speciﬁcally related to endoge-
nous reversals, has been reported so far in several studies with
discontinuous presentation of ambiguous ﬁgures using small
ISIs: from 14 to 390ms in Kornmeier et al. (2007), and even
600ms in Britz et al. (2009)2. It is invariant in amplitude and
2Psychophysical data collected with the Necker cube indicate a transition point
between switch reversals and choice reversals at ISIs between 300 and 400ms
(Orbach et al., 1963). Kornmeier et al. (2007) presented a more complex Necker
lattice, composed of nine simple cubes, and found a rising reversal rate together
with a unchanged RP in a ISI-range between 10 and 400ms. Britz et al. (2009), pre-
senting a lattice composed of four Necker cubes, identiﬁed the RP even with an ISI
of 600ms, which indicates a discrepancy between a physiological and a psychophys-
ical estimate of the transition point. Results from Kornmeier et al. (2002) however
indicate that the transition point in the case of more complex Necker lattices are at
larger ISIs compared to the simple Necker cubes.
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latency within an ISI-range at least up to 400ms (Kornmeier
et al., 2007). Interestingly, O’Donnell et al. (1988), presenting
theirNecker cubes discontinuouslywith ISIs as long as 3300ms,
did not ﬁnd a RP. We would agree with Noest et al. (2007) that,
given such long ISIs, they observed perceptual choices rather
than perceptual switches.
3. A typical eye-blink roughly lasts 200ms, occurs every 4 s on
average (e.g., Cafﬁer et al., 2003) and interrupts continuous
stimulus presentation. Thus even the continuous case (percep-
tual switch event) is full of short perceptual interruptions.
In summary, it seems appropriate to systematically distinguish
between percept choice and percept switch events. However, both
empirical and theoretical arguments indicate that the mechanisms
underlying perceptual reversals during discontinuous stimulus
presentations with short ISIs are very similar – if not identical – as
during continuous observation. We thus expect that the RP as the
earliest ERP correlate of perceptual reversals during discontinu-
ous presentation of ambiguous ﬁgures would also be identiﬁed
in the continuous case if the necessary temporal resolution were
available. The exact transition point between percept switch and
percept choice events may depend on the type of ambiguous
stimulus used.
SUMMARY AND PREDICTIONS
The Onset Paradigm successfully synchronizes endogenous per-
ceptual reversals of ambiguous ﬁgures with stimulus onset
with a precision of about ±30ms. It provides a series of
EEG signatures related to endogenous reversals which is very
similar to a series of EEG signatures related to exogenously
induced reversals of unambiguous stimulus variants with three
exceptions:
(1) An occipital RP 130ms after stimulus onset and (2) a
left-hemispheric occipital to frontopolar decrease in alpha-band
activity, starting at the same time and lasting for about 60ms, are
restricted to endogenous reversals of ambiguous ﬁgures. (3) All
subsequent signatures are delayed with endogenous compared to
exogenously induced reversals.
The smallest delay lasts roughly 40ms and is visible in the
earliest component occurring with both types of reversals, the
occipital/parietal RN, starting at 260mswith endogenous reversals
and at 220ms with exogenously induced reversals.
We speculate as follows:TheRP is amarker of a decision conﬂict
arising with ambiguity at a certain stimulus-speciﬁc perceptual
processing step. The concurrent alpha-band decrease may reﬂect
two loops of recurrent activity in order to resolve the ambiguity
within at most 60ms.
The similarity of the subsequent EEG components indicates
that after a certain step perceptual processing of endogenous
reversals and exogenously induced reversals are very similar if
not identical. The earliest and shortest temporal delay between
EEG components to endogenous and exogenously induced rever-
sals is in the same time range as the duration of the alpha-
band decrease and thus provides a good estimation of 40–60ms
endogenous disambiguation time (Kornmeier and Bach, 2006).
Disambiguation is completed at the latest 250ms after stimulus
onset.
Table 1 provides an overview of all here discussed EEG
signatures found with perceptual reversals of ambiguous and
unambiguous ﬁgures, their latencies, their locations and the stim-
uli used to induce them. Interestingly, Lumer et al. (1998) reported
frontal and parietal fMRI activation during perceptual reversals
of binocular rivalry stimuli. Further, Sterzer and Kleinschmidt
(2007) found overlapping parietal and frontal brain structures
with higher fMRI BOLD activity during endogenous reversals
of the SAM stimulus and exogenously induced reversals of a
disambiguated SAM version compared to related control con-
ditions. This is in line with several fMRI studies report about
a parietal–frontal network being activated during spontaneous
perceptual reversals of ambiguous ﬁgures and binocular rivalry
stimuli (Sterzer et al., 2009 for a review). Due to the much
coarser temporal resolution of BOLD responses it is difﬁcult to
discern between primary processes directly related to the rever-
sal event and secondary processes after the perceptual decision
has taken place. Keeping this in mind, it may well be possi-
ble that the parietal and frontal fMRI activity may be related to
the RN and the Parietal and Frontopolar Positivities, discussed
above. According to our reasoning at least the latter three sig-
natures are of secondary nature. A recent review discussing cor-
relates of conscious perception indicates that perception related
neural activity after 200ms reﬂects the “ignition” of a large-scale
prefronto-parietal network, necessary for conscious perception
and that the P3b ERP component is a relevant part of the related
neural activity (Dehaene and Changeux, 2011). The Parietal and
Frontopolar Positivies are broad and temporally overlapping ERP
occurring in the same time range as reported for the P3b. They
are thus good candidates to reﬂect the recurrent activity of this
network.
FOCUSING THE BOTTOM-UP VS. TOP-DOWN CONTROVERSY
WITH EEG
The present results suggests as optimal starting point to probe the
inﬂuence of bottom-up and top-down factors on the EEG in a
critical time window (temporal ROI) between stimulus onset and
the RN at 250ms.
EEG CORRELATES OF TOP-DOWN INFLUENCE
One of the strongest top-down factor inﬂuencing the reversal
dynamics of ambiguous ﬁgures is volitional control:Although per-
ceptual reversals cannot be totally prevented, the rate of perceptual
reversals can be doubled with the instruction to alternate the per-
cept as fast as possible, and it can be halved by the instruction to
prevent reversals (e.g., Liebert and Burk, 1985; van Ee et al., 2005;
Kornmeier et al., 2009). To our knowledge only three EEG stud-
ies on volitional control about ambiguous ﬁgures perception have
been conducted so far, two of them already published:Mathes et al.
(2006) used the Manual Response Paradigm with the Necker cube
and found increase in both a slow positive component (labeled as
increase in delta band activity and probably identical to our Pari-
etal Positivity) and in gamma-band power when participants tried
to volitionally prevent reversals compared to trials when they tried
to volitionally induce them. While the slow positivity is clearly
outside our ROI before 250ms, it is not possible to decide this
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Table 1 | EEG correlates of endogenous and exogenously induced (parentheses) perceptual reversals and their temporal occurrences with
reference to stimulus onset (onset paradigm) or to reaction times (manual response paradigm).
Peak latency (ms) Location Stimuli
Stimulus onset= 0 Reaction time= 0
Reversal positivity
(RP)
1301–6 −470 Occipital electrodes1–3 Necker cube2, Necker lattice1, 3, old/young
woman4, vase/face stimulus5, Schroeders
staircase5, Binocular rivalry stimuli6Primary visual areas6
Alpha-power decrease
(≈10Hz)
−400 to +600
(−1400–+600)
−1000 to 08, 10, 20
(−2000–0)8
Parietally distributed8 Necker lattice7, Necker cube10, 19, SAM8
130–2007 −470 to −400 Left-hemispheric, from occipital
to frontopolar electrodes7
Reversal negativity
(RN)
2601–6, 11–14
(220)1, 11, 12, 14
−340 (−380) Occipital and parietal
electrodes1, 11–13
Necker lattice1, 3, 7, 12–14, Necker cube9,
face/vase5, old/young woman4, Schröder
staircase5, Binocular rivalry stimuli6Lateral occipital and inferior
temporal areas6, 9
Late (incl. parietal and
frontopolar) positivity
3401, 4, 11–13
(300)1, 11, 12
−260 (−300) Frontopolar electrode1, 4, 12, 13 Necker cube9, 16–18, Necker lattice7, old/young
woman4, SAM8, 15, Binocular rivalry stimuli6
4701, 3, 4, 11–15
(400)1, 11, 12, 15
−130 (−200) Parietal electrodes1, 4, 12–14,
inferior temporal, and superior
parietal regions9
350 −2508, 16–18 Right parietal electrodes15–18, 20
Beta power increase
(14–26Hz)
340 (180)7 −260 (−420) Parietal and central electrodes7 Necker lattice7
Gamma power
increase (≈30–70Hz)
−400 to +600 −1000 to
–016, 17, 20, 21
Right frontal electrode20 SAM20, 21, Necker cube16, 17, Necker lattice7
−2007 −800 Right parietal/central electrodes7
300 (150)7 −300 (−450) Left-central electrodes7
Global ﬁeld power
effects
−503 −650 Right inferior parietal lobe3, 22 Necker lattice3, SAM24, Binocular rivalry
stimuli22−30024 −900
Bold indicates raw values, regular type indicates values are translated by a 600-ms reaction time2, 8, 12.
1Kornmeier and Bach (2005), 2Kornmeier et al. (2011), 3Britz et al. (2009), 4Kornmeier and Bach (2004a), 5Pitts et al. (2007), 6Britz and Pitts (2011), 7Ehm et al. (2011),
8Strüber and Herrmann (2002), 9Pitts et al. (2009), 10 I˙s¸og˘lu-Alkaç (2000), 11Kornmeier et al. (2001), 12Kornmeier and Bach (2004b), 13Kornmeier et al. (2007), 14Pitts
et al. (2008), 15Intaite et al. (2010), 16Basar-Eroglu et al. (1993), 17Strüber et al. (2001), 18Mathes et al. (2006), 19O’Donnell et al. (1988), 20 I˙s¸og˘lu-Alkaç and Struber (2006),
21Basar-Eroglu et al. (1996), 22Strüber et al. (2000), 23Britz et al. (2010), 24Muller et al. (2005).
for the gamma modulation, occurring in a time window 500ms
before the late positivity peaks.
Pitts et al. (2008) used the Onset Paradigm with the Necker
lattice and found an increased RN with a perceptual reversal when
participants were instructed to reverse as often as possible com-
pared to a passive viewing condition without volitional effort. No
effects were found in the ROI before 250ms.
In an EEG study from our lab with a slightly different variant
of the Onset Paradigm (so far only published as diploma thesis,
Hein, 2006) we found central and left temporal ERP components
370ms after stimulus onset,which differed between an instruction
to reverse condition and a passive condition as well as between
the instruction to reverse condition and an instruction to prevent
reversals condition. Again no effects were found in the ROI before
250ms.
In summary, participants could successfully modulate their
reversal rates if instructed to do so, but no EEG effects related to
volitional control were found in the critical time window between
stimulus onset and the RN at 250ms.
EEG CORRELATES OF BOTTOM-UP INFLUENCE
Presentation mode is regarded as a bottom-up factor (Long and
Toppino,2004) stronglymodulating the reversal dynamics of both,
ambiguousﬁgures andbinocular rivalry stimuli (e.g.,Orbach et al.,
1963;Kornmeier et al., 2002; Leopold et al., 2002;Maier et al., 2003;
Kanai et al., 2005,Noest et al., 2007; seeFigure 3). The reversal rates
of different ambiguous ﬁgures and also binocular rivalry stimuli
can more than double or even brought to stand still as a function
of ISI with discontinuous stimulus presentation (Orbach et al.,
1963; Kornmeier et al., 2002; Leopold et al., 2002; Maier et al.,
2003; Klink et al., 2008). In an EEG study with the Necker lattice
we looked for modulations in the ﬁrst 250ms after onset as a func-
tion of ISI. All EEG modulations we found, however, occurred at
and after 250ms, no modulation within the critical ISI could be
observed (Kornmeier et al., 2007).
SUMMARY
Neither the top-down factors nor the bottom-up factors tested
so far, signiﬁcantly modulated EEG data within the critical time
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window between stimulus onset and the occurrence of the RN at
250ms. This raises some doubts about the expected importance
of this time period for the perceptual reversal process and about
our above interpretations of the EEG literature on multistable
perception. However, maybe our interpretations are correct but
our predictions concerning expected bottom-up and top-down
modulations were wrong.
PROPOSAL OF AN INTEGRATIVE THEORY
In the following, we present a new perspective that can nicely
integrate our and previous bottom-up and top-down results. It
assumes two separate processes underlying spontaneous percep-
tual reversals, destabilization and restabilization/disambiguation,
working on different time scales (seconds and milliseconds).
The following thoughts are based on accumulating evidence
from psychophysical, EEG, and fMRI studies. All the so far used
methods have advantages and limitations and none of the tech-
niques allow a complete view on the processes at work during
spontaneous perceptual alternations. It may thus well be pos-
sible that highly relevant neural activity is restricted to a small
number of neurons and neither detectable with EEG nor with
fMRI methods. The absence of detectable signatures in a spe-
ciﬁc paradigm can thus mean that no activity is present or that
such activity is not measurable with the methods at hand. Hav-
ing this in mind, we regard the following as a working hypothesis,
allowing us to develop predictions that may be tested in future
experiments.
The terminology from non-linear dynamics provides a help-
ful framework to describe the mechanisms underlying sponta-
neous perceptual reversals of ambiguous ﬁgures (Haken, 1983;
Atmanspacher, 1992; Kruse et al., 1996; Kornmeier et al., 2004;
Braun and Mattia, 2010). Brain states are regarded as points in
a hypothetical state space. Representations of objects, e.g., a 3D
cube, are modeled as attractors and their depth as a measure of
the current representation’s stability. Physiologically, the form of
the attractor may depend on the connectivity matrix of neurons
within a relevant assembly but also on the quality of the visual
input. If the state of the perceptual system is located within an
attractor, the related neural assembly is “activated” and the per-
cept is (consciously) perceived (e.g., Kornmeier et al., 2004). Let
us look at two extreme cases: If the visual stimulus is completely
unambiguous we have a single unique and deep attractor and
thus a stable conscious experience of the represented object. In
the case of an ambiguous ﬁgure, two (or even more) represen-
tations ﬁt with the visual information and thus two (or more)
perhaps shallower attractors are in close vicinity with a rela-
tively low barrier in between. For the ambiguous Necker cube,
the two 3D interpretations would correspond to the two attractors
(Figure 12).Aperceptual reversal occurs if the systemescapes from
one attractor and jumps into the alternative one. The main ques-
tion addressed by the research of the last 200 years on ambiguous
ﬁgures could be translated to “what is the mechanism under-
lying the spontaneous state change from one attractor to the
other?”
We here regard it as conceptually fruitful to subdivide the
reversal event into two steps:
DESTABILIZATION
The observation of an ambiguous ﬁgure typically leads to a
transiently stable percept, which destabilizes over time. This
destabilization is relatively slow and takes on average 5–6 s if a
Necker cube is passively observed (Orbach et al., 1963; Kornmeier
et al., 2009). However, destabilization times (also known as stabil-
ity durations or dwell times) are highly variable within and across
participants (e.g., Borsellino et al., 1972) and also differ between
different types of ambiguous ﬁgures (e.g., Strüber and Stadler,
1999);most of the bottom-up and top-down literature on ambigu-
ous ﬁgures describes the variables that alter destabilization time.
Often, passive adaptation of low-level neurons is discussed as the
mechanism underlying a slow destabilization (e.g., Orbach et al.,
1963; Toppino and Long, 1987). This can be modeled as a slow
depth reduction of the attractor inwhich the state is located. Spon-
taneous ﬂuctuations (e.g., synaptic ﬂuctuations, variations in neu-
rotransmitter concentrations, etc.) or exogenously induced neural
ﬂuctuations (e.g., by blinks and/or eye movements, visual tran-
sients, like short interruptions (Orbach et al., 1963) of stimulus
FIGURE 12 | Destabilization and disambiguation of ambiguous visual
information. With prolonged observation of the ambiguous lattice stimulus a
transiently stable percept gets destabilized slowly, symbolized as a depth
reduction of the brain states current attractor. Both bottom-up and top-down
factors can accelerate and decelerate this process. After transition of a state
of maximal instability, fast (40–60ms) disambiguation takes place, leading to a
different stable percept. The brain state is now located in the alternative,
deeper attractor.
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presentation or light ﬂashes (Kanai et al., 2005)) may also be rele-
vant factors for a perceptual reversal and even more, the ﬂatter the
current attractor is. At least a part of the data from the Orbach
group may thus be explained by an interaction between tran-
sients (ﬂuctuations) and adaptation (inﬂuencing attractor depth).
Moreno-Bote et al. (2007) recently provided a neurally plausible
attractor model that assumes weak adaptation and noise under-
lying perceptual alternations. This model explains nicely several
empirical ﬁndings like gamma distributed dwell times and more.
Effects of volitional control on reversal rates ﬁt within the
attractor model in the following way: The instruction to voli-
tionally control the percept, typically given at the begin of an
experimental block, may cause an a priori “top-down” change of
depth of speciﬁc attractors in the sense of a global change of base-
line activity or of a certain threshold, and thus prolong or shorten
the destabilization time and increase or decrease the inﬂuence of
ﬂuctuations on the transition probability.
In summary a neural representation can be modeled as a brain
state, located in an attractor within a state space. The depth of the
attractor depends on the quality of the visual input (amongst oth-
ers). The more ambiguous the input is, the shallower is the attrac-
tor, the more sensitive the representation is to spontaneous ﬂuctu-
ations and the more probable is a reversal between representations
(attractors). It is reasonable to assume that in the case of ambigu-
ous visual information the attractor, which is currently occupied,
is initially shallow and slowly ﬂattens over time. Different bottom-
up (e.g., mode of stimulus presentation, Kanai et al., 2005) as well
as top-down factors (like volitional control,Kornmeier et al., 2009)
may be able to alter attractor depth and/or increase the noise level
(Moreno-Bote et al., 2007) and thus inﬂuence the reversal dynam-
ics, even simultaneously in an additive manner (Kornmeier et al.,
2009). Bottom-up and top-down explanations are thus no longer
mutually exclusive with this conception.
RESTABILIZATION/DISAMBIGUATION
Each reversal from one stable percept to another passes through a
point of maximal instability when the perceptual state is on top of
the barrier between the two related attractors (Figure 12).
The sensory information we receive is inherently incomplete
and ambiguous. We have to disambiguate and interpret it in order
to perceive it. Our perceptual system is optimized to disambiguate
and interpret the visual information as fast as possible (e.g., we
immediately perceive faces or objects in the formation of clouds
in the sky or in the formation of country rocks). This indicates
that due to evolutionary reasons our perceptual system tries to
keep the inevitably instable brain states in between attractors as
short as possible and thus to achieve a fast perceptual interpreta-
tion of whatever sensory information is available in order to be
able to react immediately.
These considerations apply to ambiguous-ﬁgure perceptions
in the following way: Leaving of an attractor (destabilization) and
arriving at another attractor (disambiguation/restabilization) are
different processes, working on different time scales (minutes and
seconds vs. milliseconds): Given a brain state of maximal insta-
bility either at the onset of an ambiguous ﬁgure or as a result of
the above described slow destabilization process during prolonged
observation, our perceptual system tries to ﬁnd as fast as possible
a more stable state. The early RP dERP component and the Beta
band deactivation may be related to the fast disambiguation of
ambiguous visual input, taking place immediately after stimulus
onset (within the Onset Paradigm) and being time-locked to it
(±30ms). Destabilization, on the other hand, may start imme-
diately after the new percept has been established and is much
slower. It can take from seconds to minutes and its dynamic can
be changed in different ways and perhaps at different time points.
Any EEG correlate of destabilization should thus occur before the
onset of the stimulus that is perceived as reversed and it should
indicate an upcoming reversal.
An EEG correlate of perceptual destabilization
Indeed, we recently found an increase in lower gamma-band
activity (26–40Hz) at the right-hemispheric central and parietal
electrodes roughly 200ms before onset of a Necker lattice that is
perceived as reversed compared to a lattice that is perceived as sta-
ble (Figures 9 and 10, component U1) together with an occipital
decrease of higher gamma-band activity (40–65Hz; Figures 9 and
10, component U2). No such gamma modulations were observed
with exogenously induced reversals of unambiguous lattice vari-
ants (Ehm et al., 2008, 2011). Britz et al. (2009) also used the
Necker lattice with the Onset Paradigm. They compared dom-
inant potential maps with temporally stable global ﬁeld power
(spatial SD of the potential ﬁeld) and current source distributions
for reversal and stability trials in a 50-ms pre-stimulus interval and
also found signiﬁcant differences in the right inferior parietal lobe.
No unambiguous stimulus variants were used in their experiment.
A series of related studies underscore the importance of the
above ﬁndings: Basar-Eroglu et al. (1996) reported a right ante-
rior gamma power increase within 1000ms before participants
indicated an endogenous perceptual motion reversal of the SAM
stimulus. We assume that their gamma modulation contains
both, the pre-stimulus and post-stimulus gamma modulations
indicated in our data (Ehm et al., 2011). Roeber et al. (2008)
recently reported a right-hemispheric ERP correlate of percep-
tual reversals of binocular rivalrous sine wave gratings. Nakatani
and van Leeuwen (2006) found EEG gamma-band synchroniza-
tion between right-hemispheric parietal and right-hemispheric
frontal electrode positions 800–600ms before the manual indi-
cation of a Necker cube reversal. VanRullen et al. (2006) found
higher gamma activity at right-hemispheric central locations with
illusory motion direction reversals of the Wagon-Wheel Illusion
compared to real motion reversals. Lumer et al. (1998) reported
selective right-hemispheric BOLD (fMRI) activation during per-
ceptual transitions of binocular rivalry stimuli,but no such activity
with exogenous transitions of unambiguous stimulus variants.
Sterzer andKleinschmidt (2007) found increased fMRI response in
the right inferior frontal cortex with endogenous motion reversals
of the SAMstimulus compared to exogenously induced reversals of
unambiguous SAM variants. Similarly, Ilg et al. (2008) found pos-
terior right-hemispheric fMRI activity with spontaneous motion
direction reversals of the spinning wheel illusion (Wertheimer,
1912), but no such activity with exogenously induced reversals.
Müller et al. (2005) used the onset of the SAM stimulus imme-
diately before a button press as the time reference for reversals
of motion direction. They found changes in EEG activity about
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300ms before the reversal-related SAM ﬂashes, i.e., temporally
close to our pre-onset gamma modulation. Meenan and Miller
(1994) reported about difﬁculties of patients with lesions in right
frontal areas to recognize more than one interpretation of several
ambiguous ﬁgures.
Further evidence for an important role of right-hemispheric
areas comes from recent studies with transcranial magnetic stim-
ulation (TMS). It was shown, that TMS stimulation of the parietal
lobe can modulate dwell times of ambiguous structure-from-
motion stimuli (Kanai et al., 2010, with bilateral stimulation)
and binocular rivalrous moving gratings (Carmel et al., 2010;
Kanai et al., 2011, with right-hemispheric stimulation). Stimu-
lation of the posterior parts of the parietal lobe increased dwell
times whereas stimulation of anterior parts decreased dwell times
(Kanai et al., 2011). Zaretskaya et al. (2010) found during percep-
tual reversals of a rivalrous face/house stimulus a stronger BOLD
response in the right intraparietal sulcus in nine participants and
stronger BOLD response in the left intraparietal sulcus in 6 partic-
ipants. TMS stimulation of the right intraparietal sulcus increased
dwell times.
In summary, there is converging evidence that right-
hemispheric brain areas play an important role during sponta-
neous perceptual reversals across stimulus types and categories
(ambiguous ﬁgures and binocular rivalry stimuli) and experi-
mental paradigms. More precisely, some studies, providing precise
temporal information, indicate that this activity precedes percep-
tual reversals and may thus have predictive character, although this
has to be demonstrated on a single trial level. Further, the reversal
dynamics can be altered by right-hemispheric TMS stimulation.
The spatial variability of the right-hemispheric signature across
studies is so far unexplained.
So far we can only speculate about the function of this
right-hemispheric pre-onset activity. A common feature across
all stimulus types, stimulus categories, and paradigms is that
perception changes spontaneously while the visual information
stays unchanged. As a working hypothesis we suggest that the
pre-onset gamma modulation indicates a transient brain state of
maximal instability at the transition from one stable brain state
to another or its recognition by some unconscious and so far
unknown neural instance. Such an instable brain state in between
two adjacent attractors is a necessary pre-condition for a percep-
tual reversal to occur and thus for a decision conﬂict preceding a
reversal. Moments of instable brain states should thus be inherent
in all types of perceptual reversal and related right-hemispheric
modulations – perhaps in the EEG gamma band – should be
observable. A sufﬁciently precise time reference for a reversal in
the continuous case is necessary to test this
During continuous viewing of an ambiguous ﬁgure, state insta-
bility (or its recognition) and the subsequent decision conﬂict
during (re)interpretation of the ambiguous visual information
may be in close temporal vicinity. The short interruptions in the
Onset Paradigm may act as a “temporal magniﬁer,” slowing down
the reversal process and thus temporally separating the two steps.
According to these considerations a second working hypothesis,
may thus be that the right-hemispheric central gamma modu-
lation, which is pre-onset with the Onset Paradigm, may occur
immediately before the occipital RP during a perceptual reversal of
a continuously observed Necker cube. Again, a sufﬁciently precise
time reference for a reversal in the continuous case is necessary to
test this.
TWO (OF SEVERAL) MAJOR OPEN QUESTIONS IN THE
CONTEXT OF MULTISTABLE PERCEPTION
WHAT DO NEURAL REPRESENTATIONS LOOK LIKE – AND WHY ARE
THEY SOMETIMES UNSTABLE?
This is essentially the question about perceptual states and their
destabilization over time with ambiguous visual input. One of
the basic assumptions in the multistable perception literature
is that each conscious interpretation of an ambiguous ﬁgure
is based on the activity of a distinct neural assembly (e.g.,
Blake and Logothetis, 2002, for a review). Thus one central
goal of the physiological studies of multistable perception was
to ﬁnd brain areas where neural activity ﬂuctuates in correla-
tion with the perceptual experience, in contrast to areas with
unchanged neural activity, reﬂecting the unchanged visual input.
Especially the border between sensory and percept-related activ-
ity was assumed to play a key role for the perceptual reversal
process and consciousness in general (e.g., Blake and Logothetis,
2002).
Logothetis et al. (e.g., Logothetis, 1998; Leopold andLogothetis,
1999) recorded from primate single cells in different brain areas,
while the animals reported their percepts of binocular rivalry stim-
uli. They found that the number of neurons with a percept-related
ﬁring pattern increased fromV1 (striate cortex, 20%) over V2,V4,
MT, medial superior temporal sulcus (MST, 80), the inferotempo-
ral cortex (IT, 80%), and the superior temporal sulcus (STS, 80%;
Logothetis, 1998; Leopold and Logothetis, 1999). A large number
of V1 neurons remained active whether the stimulus was per-
ceived or suppressed. Percept-related ﬁring patterns were neither
found in monocular V1 neurons (e.g., Leopold and Logothetis,
1999) nor in LGN neurons (Lehky and Maunsell, 1996). Several
results from fMRI studies are in line with these single cell ﬁndings,
indicating the importance of higher cortical areas for object rep-
resentation. Tong et al. (1998) presented binocular rivalry stimuli
containing the picture of a house and of a face and found recipro-
cal modulations in BOLD activity in the parahippocampal place
area and the fusiform face area highly correlating with partici-
pants’ reports of seeing a face or a house. Interestingly, this level
of modulation was comparable to that with binocular house and
face perceptions (non-rivalrous conditions). Similarly, Andrews
et al. (2002) presented Rubin’s ambiguous Face/Vase stimulus and
found slightly increased BOLD activity in the fusiform face area
during the perception of the faces compared to trials with house
percepts. RecentlyWatanabe et al. (2011) found inV1 strong fMRI
BOLD effects of attention but none of dominance vs. suppression
intervals of binocular rivalry stimuli.
Other studies point to the importance of lower-level areas for
object representations: Dodd et al. (2001) reported correlation
between single cell activity in primate area MT and the per-
ceived motion direction of an ambiguous structure-from-motion
stimulus. Further, fMRI studies provided evidence for percept-
related activity in V1 (e.g., Tong and Engel, 2001) and in the LGN
(Haynes et al., 2005) during humans’ observation of binocular
rivalry stimuli.
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Today there are potential explanations for the inconsistency
between single cell and fMRI ﬁndings: fMRI BOLD activity is
(like EEG activity) more related to local ﬁeld potentials than to
neural spiking activity (Logothetis et al., 2001). Thus percept-
related modulation in early visual areas, as shown with fMRI,
should be reﬂected in local ﬁeld potentials rather than in spike
modulation. This has been demonstrated recently in primates
(Wilke et al., 2006;Maier et al., 2008). Further, information may be
coded by temporal synchronization of neural activity (i.e., tempo-
ral coding), rather than amplitude modulations. Fries et al. (1997)
presented binocular rivalry stimuli to cats and found precept-
related synchronization of neural gamma-band oscillations in V1.
Like surface EEG, the MEG is believed to reﬂect synchronous spik-
ing activity of a large number of cortical neurons. MEG studies on
binocular rivalry showed correlations between activity over a wide
range of sensors (from occipital to frontal lobes) and observers
dominance and suppression reports, indicating the involvement of
the entire cortex in conscious object representation (e.g., Tononi
et al., 1998; Dehaene and Changeux, 2011).
In summary, there is no isolated cortical area selectively cor-
relating with the participant’s current percept. The locus of the
attractor and its speciﬁc neural realization is so far not under-
stood (e.g., Moreno-Bote et al., 2007). Rather, object representa-
tions seem to result from a complex, probably reciprocal interplay
between early visual and several higher brain areas across the cor-
tex. Further, most of the physiological correlates are transient in
nature and so far it is unclear how the maintenance of a stable
conscious percept is neuronally realized (Ehm et al., 2011). This
however, has to be understood in order to understand the destabi-
lization of a given representation in the case of ambiguous ﬁgures
and its susceptibility to bottom-up and top-down factors. There
is some experimental and theoretical evidence that neural activity
is somewhat weaker with ambiguous or rivalrous stimuli com-
pared to disambiguated variants (e.g., Leopold and Logothetis,
1999; Kornmeier and Bach, 2006; Moreno-Bote et al., 2007; Pitts
et al., 2010). This may indicate that the activated attractors are in
general ﬂatter and thus more susceptible to any type of ﬂuctuation
the more ambiguous the visual information is. In a recent study
we analyzed this systematically with ambiguous ﬁgures from dif-
ferent categories: Slight low-level ﬁgural changes of an ambiguous
ﬁgure disambiguate it and produce more sustained stable per-
cepts. We found dramatic ERP differences between ambiguous
ﬁgures and their disambiguated variants, independent of the rever-
sal dynamics and across different types of ﬁgures (Necker cube,
Old/Young Woman and SAM stimulus, as latest – unpublished-
results from our lap indicate). This difference might (directly
or indirectly) reﬂect the difference in depth of the respective
attractors (Kornmeier and Bach, 2009).
WHO DECIDES ON THE PERCEPTUAL RESULT IF THE VISUAL INPUT IS
AMBIGUOUS?
This is essentially the question about perceptual transitions. A
large number of psychophysical studies about ambiguous ﬁgures
aimed to ﬁnd or understand “the one mechanism” that underlies
spontaneous perceptual reversals – they looked for the deciding
instance or mechanism. The major difference between bottom-up
and top-down explanations thus pertains to the question whether
this process is located at lower visual or at high-level cognitive
processing units (e.g., Long and Toppino, 2004).
We suggest the reversal process can be subdivided into two
separate steps, which need to be understood:
(1) How the current brain state gets out of its attractor and on
top of the barrier in between this one and the alternative attrac-
tor. (2) How the “decision” takes place about whether the instable
brain state returns to the old or the alternative attractor or perhaps
whether it approaches another, so far less probable attractor.
Both steps depend on several factors like the energy distri-
bution of the state space at this speciﬁc moment and thus the
depth of the currently activated and the alternate attractors and
the amount of energy ﬂuctuations within the system (endogenous
and/or exogenously introduced neural noise or background activ-
ity). Recent empirical evidence indicates that these factors depend
at least in part on the perceptual history (on different time scales;
e.g., Hesselmann et al., 2008; Pastukhov and Braun, 2008). Inﬂu-
ence may be exerted at different steps and levels of complexity
during visual perception (Blake and Logothetis, 2002; Kornmeier
and Bach, 2006; Sterzer and Rees, 2008; Bartels and Logothetis,
2010), which is in line with the distributed object representation
account discussed above. Nakatani and van Leeuwen (2006), e.g.,
provided evidence for different types of reversal of a Necker cube
within and between participants, reﬂected by different patterns
of synchrony in EEG oscillations. Blake and Logothetis (2002)
summarized related evidence from the binocular rivalry literature
and Bartels and Logothetis (2010) found recently with binocu-
lar rivalry stimuli, that perceptual reversals can be triggered at
different levels of complexity during the perceptual process.
In summary, there is probably no unique neural switch area or
“unique gate to conscious perception” within the brain that gov-
erns perceptual reversals. However, the EEG ﬁndings discussed
above indeed indicate some generality aspects across types of
reversals, types of stimuli (e.g., Necker cube or old/young woman)
and even across categories (ambiguous ﬁgures and binocular
rivalry stimuli). First, each endogenous perceptual reversal comes
with a transient state of instability at the barrier between the
two alternative attractors (Figure 11). The generality of the pre-
reversal right-hemispheric activity (e.g., Britz et al., 2009; Britz
et al., 2010; Ehm et al., 2011) may classify this modulation as a
good candidate reﬂecting this instable brain state or its detection.
What this would mean in terms of neural processing, however, is
so far unclear. More research has to be done in order to determine
more attributes of this right-hemispheric activity modulation in
detail.
Second, a general ﬁnding across stimulus types (Necker cube,
Old/Young woman) and categories (ambiguous ﬁgures and binoc-
ular rivalry stimuli) is the early occipital RP. It may be possible that
after some central instance (perhaps general across types of rever-
sals) has notiﬁed an instable perceptual brain state (reﬂected in
the right-hemispheric activity modulation, described above), the
“decision” about the perceptual outcome needs one (or two) top-
down reactivation(s) of early visual areas for reinterpretation of
the available visual information. It may also be possible that the
surface EEG can only detect the strong activity of the “low-level
receiver” (i.e., the RP) but not the potentially weaker activity of the
“higher-level sender,”wherever in the brain it may be located. This
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is highly speculative and further experiments are necessary, e.g.,
to describe the attributes of the RP in more detail. A step in this
direction has been done recently by demonstrating the RP’s inde-
pendence of stimulus size (Kornmeier et al., 2011) and stimulus
complexity (cubes or lattices Kornmeier and Bach, 2003).
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Applying the Onset Paradigm to investigate spontaneous percep-
tual reversals of both ambiguous ﬁgures and binocular rivalry
stimuli sizably improved the temporal resolution of the underly-
ing processes. Since its ﬁrst application several independent lines
of evidence encouraged us to propose that spontaneous perceptual
reversals are governed by two independent processes working on
different time scales: (1) The transiently stable perceptual interpre-
tation of the ambiguous information destabilizes over time until
the perceptual system reaches a state of maximal instability. This
destabilization is slow in the order of seconds to minutes and sub-
ject to multiple endogenous and exogenous inﬂuences. The result
of this destabilization, a perceptual brain state of maximal insta-
bility seems to be correlated with a right-hemispheric modulation
in EEG activity which occurs pre-onset in the case of discontinu-
ous stimulus presentation. (2) Due to evolutionary pressure our
brain is optimized to keep unavoidably instable brain states as brief
as possible. Electrophysiological evidence indicates that the transi-
tion from maximal instability to a (potentially altered) stable brain
state is very fast, in the order of 40–60ms, and not susceptible to
endogenous or exogenous manipulations. EEG data further indi-
cates that perceptual processes within 350ms before the manual
indication of a perceptual reversal are post-decision and thus of
secondary nature with respect to the reversal process. The (uncon-
scious) decision about the perceptual outcome thus seems to be
rather early.
Numerous psychophysical and physiological evidence indi-
cates that neural representations are not restricted to circum-
scribed brain regions but involve almost the entire cortex. A
clear border between sensory and perceptual processing is thus
difﬁcult to ﬁnd and may depend on experimental and stimulus
details.
The available evidence further suggests that, in contrary to
previous expectations, no circumscribed neural unit exists that
decides about the perceptual outcome. Rather, perceptual rever-
sals can be induced at different locations and levels of complexity
along the processing of visual information.
Recent evidence from our lab suggests the existence of a central
evaluation instance that estimates the reliability of the percep-
tual outcome, given a certain quality of visual information. The
outcome of this evaluation thus may indirectly reﬂect the depth
of the activated attractor (e.g., Kornmeier and Bach, 2009; Has-
sberg, 2010). Understanding the mechanisms of such reliability
estimation may be highly relevant for a better understanding of
psychiatric perception disorders and ambiguous ﬁgure may be an
interesting tool for this.
Ambiguous ﬁgure perception is an ideal model to investigate
changes of brain states between already existing attractors in other
domains. Already the Gestalt Psychologists regarded this phenom-
enon as interesting for the understanding of insight phenomena
(Knoblich and Öllinger, 2006), where probably a transition from
an existing attractor to an instantaneous newly built attractor
takes place. Most interesting in this respect may be the tran-
sient states of maximal instability on top of the barrier between
two attractors (“acategorial states,” Feil and Atmanspacher, 2010).
Thus ambiguous ﬁgure perception may also be an interesting tool
for future research in insight processes. The gain in temporal
resolution attained with the Onset Paradigm provided speciﬁc
electrophysiological marker of critical processing steps underly-
ing spontaneous perceptual reversals of ambiguous ﬁgures. The
speculations above about their functional role encourage precise
experimental hypotheses that may be tested in future experiments.
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